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The Trend over Time of the Gender Wage Gap in Italy
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We analyse gender wage inequalities in Italy in the mid-1990s and in the mid-2000s. In this 
period important labour market developments occurred: institutional changes have loosened 
the use of flexible and atypical contracts; the female employment rates and educational 
levels have substantially increased. We identify the time trends of different components of the 
gender wage gap by estimating wage distributions in the presence of covariates and sample 
selection and by counterfactual microsimulations. We find that women swam against the tide: 
whilst the trend in female qualifications slightly reduced the gender wage gap, the gender 
relative trends in the wage structure significantly increased it. 
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During the decade that goes from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s and in a period of quite
stable and low economic growth,1 the Italian labour market experienced some important
developments mostly in terms of legislation, but also in terms of workforce participation
and composition. Up to the second half of the 1990s, the Italian standard work arrange-
ment had traditionally been full-time, open-ended, and characterized by one of the strictest
employment protection legislation, mostly against dismissals, in the OECD area (Lazear,
1990; Kugler and Pica, 2008). Since 1997, Italy has undertaken major steps towards “ﬂexi-
bility” by way of labour market reforms that have liberalized the use of ﬂexible and atypical
contracts. Law No. 196/1997 (“Treu Package”),2 Legislative Decree No. 368/2001, Law
No. 30/2003 (“Biagi’s Law”), and the subsequent Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 have
indeed legitimized temporary work agencies and ﬁxed-term contracts under general con-
ditions and given rise to the expansion of ﬂexible and atypical work arrangements, like
part-time jobs, seasonal jobs, youth work-training, apprenticeship contracts, jobs on call,
time-sharing, staff-leasing, and work on project.
At the same time, the Italian labour market experienced two further developments which
might be partially associated with the aforementioned reforms: a falling gender gap in em-
ployment rates and a falling gender gap in the levels of education. With regard to the former,
the female employment rates increased signiﬁcantly from 1995 to 2005, both in absolute
value and relatively to men. Considering the population in the age range 25–54, the female
employment rate went from 46.6% in 1995 to 57.9% in 2005, whereas the male employment
rate remained stable, going from 84.5% in 1995 to 86.6% in 2005. As regards converging
levels of education, the fraction of women with a post secondary or tertiary education has in-
creased more than the corresponding share of men. Among the population in the age range
25–64, the share of women with at least a post secondary education went from 33.6% in
1995 to 50.6% in 2005, whilst the corresponding share of men went from 39.1% in 1995 to
50.2%.3
These developments of the Italian labour market might have asymmetrically hit the re-
muneration of men and women. One explanation of women suffering wage penalties is that
men and women have different preferences towards work: given the Italian male bread-
winner system, women might be more willing than men to exchange wages for ﬂexible
features of the work arrangement in order to reconcile family responsibilities with employ-
ment. Women might therefore be more altruistic and less career-oriented than males. When
the institutional setting becomes more oriented and favourable to ﬂexible form of work ar-
rangements like part-time jobs, on call jobs, and job sharing, the trade-off between ﬂexibility
and wages might be less costly and, thereby, a reduction in the gender wage gap might be
observed. There is however a debate about whether atypical contracts spur the development
1In Italy the average GDP annual growth rate was around 1.5% in the period 1995–2005 (Eurostat).
2For an assessment of the Treu reform, see Sciulli (2006a,b) and Schindler (2009)
3These ﬁgures are available in Internet at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
1of a secondary labour market in which workers get trapped in a cycle of unstable and low
paid jobs. If it is so and women are more likely to get into atypical jobs, observed female
wage penalties might increase. Moreover, if ﬂexible forms of job contracts make it easier
for women to reconcile family responsibilities with working career, the female labour force
participation increases and women with low earnings potential, who would not have partici-
pated otherwise, get into the workforce and start featuring in the observed wage distribution.
This generates an increase in the observed gender wage gap over time, a statistical artefact
due to a time-variation in the composition of the sample of working women. With regard to
the relative change in the level of education, when women become more and more educated
with respect to men, we would expect a decrease in the observed gender wage gap. Nev-
ertheless, if the rewards of education has decreased over time, the gender wage gap might
be only slightly affected by women becoming relatively more educated. As pointed out by
Blau and Khan (1997, 1999), the overall wage structure, i.e. the array of prices of labour
market skills, can indeed have an important effect on gender differentials.
The main question addressed by this article is whether and how gender inequalities in
wages have changed in Italy in the face of the important labour market developments of
the last years. If one simply compares the raw gender wage gap in the mid-1990s to the
one in the mid-2000s, it is noticed that the relative remuneration of men and women did
not change. This preliminary evidence from raw data might however be just a statistical
artefact, with the risk of generating misleading conclusions. The total gender wage gap can
indeed be seen as made up of a component due to gender differences in the distribution of
individual characteristics and the component due to gender differences in the rewards of the
same characteristics. Understanding the contribution of each component to the evolution
over time of the gender wage gap is policy relevant in order to design policies that are
effective in pursuing the gender equality target.
The literature on gender inequalities in the labour market has recently paid attention to
developing methodological tools and increasing thereby the available set of instruments to
deepen the understanding of the gender wage gap issue (Blundell et al., 2007; Olivetti and
Petrongolo, 2008; Albrecht et al., 2009; Picchio and Mussida, 2011). Despite the increased
recognition of the importance of gender pay differentials, research on the gender wage gap
in Italy has been scarce. Some effort has been nonetheless made in recent years by Rus-
tichelli (2005), Addabbo et al. (2007), and Addabbo and Favaro (2007). However, to our
knowledge, no country-speciﬁc study on the trends over time of the gender wage gap has
been carried out for Italy and for other European countries with similar labour market trends.
From the empirical point of view, this paper contributes to ﬁll this gap in the literature.
In order to have a meaningful comparison over time of the evolution of the gender wage
gap, we carry out an econometric analysis that is able to: i) net out the effect of changes in
the distribution of individual characteristics, as they could erroneously point to a reduction
in gender inequalities, whereas it is just an increase of the female endowments of charac-
teristics that are highly rewarded; ii) take into account changes in the nonrandom selection
2into the workforce, as they might wrongly point to an increase in wage inequality, whilst it
is simply that women with low earnings potential are more likely to feature in the observed
wage distribution than in the past.
The econometric analysis is based on the technique proposed by Picchio and Mussida
(2011) to estimate wage distributions in the presence of covariates and sample selection
and on simulation algorithms to derive counterfactual distributions. The contribution of this
paper from the methodological viewpoint consists in extending the simulation procedure in
Picchio and Mussida (2011) to decompose the evolution over time of the gender wage gap
into the component due to gender trends in the distribution of individual characteristics and
into the component due to gender trends in the rewards of characteristics.
The empirical analysis is carried out on the basis of two longitudinal datasets. The ﬁrst
one is the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which covers the period before
the labour market reforms, i.e. from 1994 until 1997. The second one is the European Union
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC). It covers the period after the reforms,
which goes from 2004 until 2007. We ﬁnd that women have been swimming against the
tide. Whilst the trend in women’s relative qualiﬁcations slightly reduced the gender wage
gap, the trends in wage structures of men and women substantially increased it.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the samples. Section 3
presents the methodology to estimate wage distributions in the presence of covariates and
sample selection. Section 4 describe how we decompose the gender wage gap in different
components and analyse their time-changes across all quantiles of the distribution. We
comment the ﬁndings and discuss policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Sample
The empirical analysis exploits data from two longitudinal surveys. The ﬁrst one is the
ECHP, which covers the period before the institutional changes, i.e. from 1994 to 1997.
The second one is the SILC, which instead covers the period after the labour market reforms,
i.e. from 2004 to 2007. We select data for Italy, where the surveys were conducted by the
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) under the coordination of Eurostat.4
Since information on wages is retrospectively collected in both panels, we lose the last
years (1997 and 2007). We exclude from our sample individuals younger than 25 years
and older than 55 years to avoid to get mixed with education enrolment and early retire-
ment issues. We drop individuals who were in the army, self-employed, inactive, or with
missing values for some variables used in the econometric analysis. Finally, we exclude
from the sample individuals lying in the ﬁrst or last percentile of the wage or working hours
distributions.
4More information about the ECHP is available in Internet at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/-
portal/eurostat/home. See Eurostat (2004) or/and go to http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/-
microdata/eu_silc for details about the SILC data.
3Considering both the employed and the non-employed, 10,863 female observations and
8,064 male observations remain over the period 1994–1996. The corresponding numbers
for the period 2004–2006 are 12,635 for women and 10,118 for men. The numbers of
wage observations are 4,316 (6,722) for women and 6,663 (8,918) for men in 1994–1996
(2004–2006). Thedeﬁnitionsofemploymentandnon-employmentarebasedonself-deﬁned
economic status and therefore do not match the ILO deﬁnition. The female employment rate
rose from 39.7% in the mid-1990s to 53.2% in the mid-2000s, while the male employment
rate went from 82.6% to 88.1%. Hence, the gender gap in employment rates decreased over
time because of a substantial increase in the female employment rate.
The wage variable is the net hourly wage of employees’ main occupation,5 deﬂated to
2004 constant prices.6 The raw statistics in Tables 1 and 2 report the gender wage gap in
the mid-1990s and in the mid-2000s. The raw relative remuneration of men and women
remained stable with a slight decline over time: men were earning on average 6% more than
women in the mid-1990s and 5% more than women in the mid-2000. The pay gap is not
constant over the wage distributions. It is well perceived at the bottom and in the middle
of the wage support, but it disappears at the top of the distribution. In the mid-1990s (mid-
2000s), it went from 20% (12%)7 at the bottom of the distribution to 6% (5%) at the median
and virtually nil at the top of the wage distribution. Figure 1 plots the kernel estimate of
the wage density for men and women in both periods. The empirical probability density
functions of the net hourly wage are positively skewed and display excess kurtosis for both
periods and genders.8
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Net Hourly Wage by Gender in Italy,
1994–1996 and 2004–2006
Men Women Overall
Net hourly wage (e) Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
1994–1996 7.943 2.800 7.604 3.005 7.810 2.887
2004–2006 9.566 3.646 9.208 3.778 9.412 3.707
Notes: Wages are in constant prices (2004 prices). They are deﬂated by using the Consumer Price
Index (CPI), gathered by ISTAT.
Table 3 displays summary statistics of the covariates used in the econometric analysis.
5The net hourly wage is computed starting from the employees’ yearly net cash income, variable PI111
(PY010N), and using the number of months at work, obtained from the calendar activities variables PC001-
PC013 (PL210A-PL210L), and the number of hours usually worked per week, PE005 (PL060) in the 1994–
1996 (2004–2006) panel. Considering that on average there are 4.345 weeks in a month, the hourly wage in
the mid-1990s (mid-2000s) is computed as follows: w = PI111=(# of months at work  PE005  4:345)
(w = PY010N=(# of months at work  PL060  4:345)).
6The deﬂator is the Consumer Price Index (CPI), gathered by ISTAT.
720% = [exp(0:182)   1]  100 and 12% = [exp(0:113)   1]  100.
8The skewness and the kurtosis of the wage distributions are, respectively, around 1.4 and 5.5 in both time
periods and for both genders.
4Table 2: Raw Gender Wage Gap in Italy, 1994–1996 and
2004–2006 (gap in log points)
1994–1996 2004–2006
Proportion of women 0.393 0.430
Mean 0.059 0.048
5th percentile 0.182 0.113
10th percentile 0.107 0.086
25th percentile 0.081 0.070
50th percentile 0.059 0.048
75th percentile 0.036 0.031
90th percentile -0.008 0.000
95th percentile -0.011 -0.002
Notes: The raw wage gap is measured as the difference between the log male hourly wage
and the log female hourly wage.
Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates for Net Hourly Wages
5Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Covariates by Gender and Time Period
1994–1996 2004–2006
Male Female Male Female
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All sample
Employed .826 .379 .397 .489 .881 .323 .532 .499
Age (years) 38.885 8.692 39.515 8.724 39.937 8.467 4.564 8.462
Education§
None, elementary, or lower secon. .492 .500 .566 .496 .436 .496 .437 .496
Upper secondary .404 .491 .354 .478 .389 .487 .363 .481
Post secondary or tertiary .108 .310 .092 .289 .175 .380 .200 .400
Area of residence
North-West .198 .398 .187 .390 .221 .415 .222 .416
North-East .166 .372 .164 .370 .243 .429 .222 .416
Centre .248 .432 .240 .427 .232 .422 .234 .424
South .382 .486 .403 .491 .304 .460 .321 .467
Bad health† .300 .458 .357 .479 .251 .434 .301 .459
Married .714 .452 .801 .400 .652 .476 .728 .445
# household members 2.884 1.182 2.897 1.154 3.288 1.213 3.349 1.146
Presence of child < 12 years .247 .431 .253 .435 .345 .476 .350 .477
Potential Experience (years) 17.512 10.761 12.325 11.950 21.686 10.077 17.549 12.161
1994 or 2004 .328 .470 .330 .470 .176 .381 .174 .379
1995 or 2005 .346 .476 .344 .475 .339 .473 .339 .474
1996 or 2006 .325 .469 .326 .469 .485 .500 .487 .500
Observations 8,064 10,863 10,118 12,635
Employees
Age (years) 39.596 8.362 38.379 8.159 4.161 8.339 39.967 8.227
Education§
None, elementary, or lower secon. .461 .499 .339 .473 .416 .493 .283 .451
Upper secondary .428 .495 .523 .500 .405 .491 .432 .495
Post secondary or tertiary .109 .312 .139 .346 .179 .383 .285 .452
Area of residence
North-West .222 .416 .265 .441 .230 .421 .267 .442
North-East .188 .391 .223 .416 .258 .438 .282 .450
Centre .261 .439 .250 .433 .239 .426 .250 .433
South .325 .468 .258 .438 .273 .445 .202 .401
Bad health† .289 .453 .312 .463 .241 .428 .272 .445
Married .778 .416 .723 .448 .688 .463 .643 .479
Potential Experience (years) 18.772 9.881 16.269 9.255 22.228 9.593 20.755 9.496
1994 or 2004 .337 .473 .335 .472 .174 .379 .173 .378
1995 or 2005 .344 .475 .345 .475 .341 .474 .336 .472
1996 or 2006 .318 .466 .320 .466 .485 .500 .491 .500
Part-time worker .025 .156 .149 .356 .043 .203 .302 .459
Temporary contract .049 .215 .056 .230 .072 .259 .116 .321
Occupation‡
White-collar high-skilled worker .200 .400 .319 .466 .326 .469 .442 .497
White-collar low-skilled worker .309 .462 .426 .495 .205 .403 .342 .474
Blue-collar worker .492 .500 .255 .436 .470 .499 .216 .411
Observations 6,663 4,316 8,918 6,722
§ Educational indicators refer to the highest and successfully completed educational attainment of a person. We used the
ISCED-97 educational classiﬁcation to build these indicators.
† “Bad health” is a dummy indicator based on self-perceived health. It is equal to one if the individual declares that her
health is in a fair, rather bad, or bad conditions. It is equal to zero, if the answer is either good or rather good condition.
‡ The occupational indicators are built on the basis of the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupation (ISCO-88).
Taking the one-digit ISCO-88 categories, the white-collar high skilled indicator corresponds to categories 1 up to 3; the
white-collar low skilled indicator corresponds to categories 4 and 5; the blue-collar indicator corresponds to categories
from 6 to 9.
6They are calculated by gender and time period on the overall sample (top panel) and on the
subsample of employees (bottom panel). Men and women are on average 39 years old in the
mid-1990s and somewhat older (40 years of age) in the the mid-2000s. Educational dum-
mies are deﬁned according to UNESCO’s International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education
(ISCED) and distinguish between education completed at three different stages: lower sec-
ondary, upper secondary, and post-secondary or tertiary education. In both periods working
women are more educated than working men. This gender difference becomes even stronger
in the mid-2000s, when 28.5% of working women have a post-secondary education attain-
ment against 17.9% of working men. This is reﬂected in the proportion of people with
a lower educational attainment: 28.3% of working women have no more than lower sec-
ondary levels against 41.6% of working men. Gender gaps in education are however much
lower if one considers both employed and non-employed people: in the mid-2000s, 20%
of women have a post-secondary or tertiary educational attainment, against 17.5% of men.
This shows that women are more educated than men and that women with low education
have a lower propensity to be at work than low educated men.
Four indicators capture the geographical area of residence by splitting Italy in North-
West, North-East, Centre, and South. Around one half of the employees live in the North
of Italy, while the others are equally distributed in the Centre and South. The indicator of
self-perceived health captures the effect of health status (perceived or subjective) on wages
and propensity to work and less than one third of the sample declares not to be in good
health. Marital status and household variables like the number of household members and
the presence of child (younger than 12) are also considered. The percentage of married
people decreased over time going from 71% (80%) in the mid-1990s to 65% (73%) in the
mid-2000s for (wo)men, while the average number of household components increased. A
measure of potential experience, computed as difference between age and the age when the
ﬁrst regular job started, is also introduced as likely to affect earnings and individual job
opportunities.
Finally, we consider a set of variables aimed at capturing job heterogeneity, such as in-
dicators for part-time jobs, for temporary jobs, and for type of occupation. In both periods
working women are more likely to hold temporary or part-time jobs than working men.
This evidence is stronger in the mid-2000s: 30.2% of female employees have a part-time
job, against 4.3% of male employees; 11.6% of working women hold a temporary contract,
against 7.2% of working men. Using the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupa-
tions (ISCO-88), we deﬁne indicators aimed at capturing tasks heterogeneity. Men are more
likely to be blue collar workers in both periods. In 2004–2006 almost 50% of working men
are blue collar workers against 21.6% of working women. The share of female blue col-
lars decreased over time, while the share of high skilled white collar women increased from
31.9% in the mid-1990s to 44.2% in the mid-2000s.
73 Estimation of Wage Distributions in the Presence of Co-
variates and Sample Selection
As said in the Introduction, this study is aimed at understanding the evolution of the gender
wage gap over time and disentangle the contribution given by the time trend of the differ-
ent components of the gender wage gap. In other words, in order to have a meaningful
comparison over time of the evolution of the gender wage gap, we require an econometric
approach that is able to net out the effect of changes over time in the distribution of individ-
ual characteristics and take into account changes over time in the nonrandom selection into
the workforce. Moreover, as labour markets could be internally very differentiated, we are
not just interested in looking at the evolution of the average gender wage gap. We are rather
interested in its evolution across all the wage distribution. The starting point is therefore to
design an econometric model that allows us to ﬂexibly estimate wage distributions in the
presence of covariates and sample selection.
Different non/semi-parametric estimators have been proposed to model wage distribu-
tions in the presence of covariates. DiNardo et al. (1996) adapted kernel density estimator to
the case in which sample weights are attached to each observation. Counterfactual densities
are estimated by “re-weighting” functions, which depend on different covariates distribution
between populations. Fortin and Lemieux (1998) divided the wage support in small intervals
and estimated the probability of being in each wage interval using an ordered response (pro-
bit) model. Once the model is estimated, counterfactual distributions can be predicted by
playing with covariates and/or estimated coefﬁcients of the ordered response model. Donald
et al. (2000) considered wage distributions as if they were duration distributions and applied
hazard function (HF) based estimation techniques. Picchio and Mussida (2011) adapted the
HF estimator proposed by Donald et al. (2000) to a panel data framework with sample selec-
tion correction. Finally, probably the most common method to estimate distributions in the
presence of covariates is quantile regression (e.g. Buchinsky, 1994), followed by Machado
and Mata’s (2005) (MM) procedure to carry out counterfactual comparisons of densities.
Albrecht et al. (2009) adapted the MM decomposition to account for sample selection.
The approach used here for modelling wage distributions in the presence of covariates
and sample selection follows Picchio and Mussida (2011). It takes advantage of panel data:
multiple observations per individual are exploited to identify the individual unobservables
jointly determining workforce participation and wages, without relying exclusively on ex-
clusion restrictions or strict parametric restrictions on the unobserved heterogeneity distri-
bution.9 This method allows us to recover the sample selection corrected wage structure –
the set of parameters determining the wage distribution – by gender and by time period. In
Section 4, we will exploit the estimated wage structures and the empirical distributions of
individual characteristics of men and women in the mid-1990s and mid-2000s to understand
9See Picchio and Mussida (2011) for a discussion about this and other methods to estimate wage distribu-
tions in the presence of covariates and sample selection.
8the evolution over time of different components of the Italian gender wage gap by way of
microsimulations and counterfactual analysis.
3.1 Model Speciﬁcation
In what follows, consider a panel data setting where t is the time indicator.10 We assume
that selection into employment is described by the following random effects logit model
yt = 1[z
0
t + " + ut > 0]; t = 1; ;T (1)
where 1() is the indicator function, yt is the scalar indicator variable denoting employment
status at time t, zt is the K-vector of regressors explaining the employment probability,
 2 <K is a parameter vector, " is unobserved heterogeneity, and ut is the idiosyncratic
error term with logistic distribution .
With regard to wages, we assume that all individual differences in the wage distribution
can be characterized by observed characteristics xt and individual heterogeneity v. For a
covariate vector xt and individual heterogeneity v there is a positive random variable Wt
with associated probability and cumulative density functions f(wtjxt;v) and F(wtjxt;v). If








where S(wtjxt;v) is the survivor function, i.e. the probability of being paid at least a wage
equal to wt. We specify the hazard function as
(wtjxt;v) = ht(wtjxt)v; (3)
where ht is the structural wage hazard function at time t.11
While in the duration literature the hazard function is usually assumed to have a mixed
proportional hazard form, here we allow the covariate effect to be different over the wage
support, at different percentiles of the unconditional wage distribution. We partition the
wage support into P intervals and we allow the covariate effect to vary over these intervals.
The variation is with respect to a baseline wage hazard function h0(wt) that, in order to
avoid too strict parametric assumptions, is assumed to be piecewise constant.12 Formally,
10We suppress the individual indicator for the sake of clarity.
11In the empirical analysis there are some regressors that enter the selection equation but do not enter the
wage hazard function. These exclusion restrictions are in line with those often used in the labour supply liter-
ature (e.g. Mroz, 1987): indicators for the presence of children and the number of members in the household.
12A piecewise constant function is constant within predeﬁned intervals. We divided the wage support into
J = 72 intervals Ij = [wj 1;wj), where j = 1;:::;J, w0 < w1 < ::: < wJ, w0 = 0, and wJ = 1. w1 and






H) the pth wage interval over which the covariate effect is assumed to
be constant (i.e. proportional to the baseline wage hazard function), such that 
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In order to reduce the risk of over-ﬁtting bias and to have a reasonable trade-off between
model parsimony and ﬁt to the data at hand, we chose P by minimizing the Akaike In-
formation Criterion (AIC). It turned out that P = 8 for men in 1994–1996 and P = 10
for men in 2004–2006 and women in both time periods minimize the AIC, with dividing
points approximatively at the [100 1
P;100 2
P;:::;100P 1
P ] percentiles of the unconditional
wage distribution.
If the unobserved determinants of the wage distribution and of the employment equation
(v and ") are independent, inference on the wage distribution can be based solely on the
distribution of wjx. However, if v and " are dependent then inference has to be based on the
joint distribution of w;yjx.13 The joint distribution of v and " is approximated by a bivariate
discrete distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984) with a ﬁxed number of support points,
which have unknown locations and probability masses. By doing so, we avoid too strict
parametric assumptions. We assume that (v;") has four probability points with probability
masses deﬁned as follows:
p1  Pr(v = v1;" = "1) p2  Pr(v = v2;" = "1)
p3  Pr(v = v1;" = "2) p4  Pr(v = v2;" = "2) = 1   p1   p2   p3:
In this case, we need to estimate four points of support and three probability masses.14 The





with 4 = 0:
widthoftheother70wagebaselinesegmentsbydividingthewagesupportbetweenw1 andwJ 1 in70equally
spaced intervals. Our choice of the number of the baseline segments is somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, it
returns a narrow segment width (0.22e and 0.28e for the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s respectively) and it is
thereby suitable for ﬂexibly approximating all possible wage hazard functions.
13In this case, y is indeed related to v and knowledge that y = 1 is informative on v. The dependence
between v and " will alter E(vjW  w;x) and therefore the wage distribution conditional on x. Consider for
example that, if the distribution of vjy = 1 is stochastically dominated by the population distribution of v and
this is ignored, the conditional wage hazard function (wjx;v) would be underestimated, i.e. every quantile
of the conditional wage distribution would be overestimated.
14v and " are independent if and only if p1p4 = p2p3 (Van den Berg et al., 1994; Van den Berg and
Lindeboom, 1998). This makes easy to test for sample selection.
103.2 The Likelihood Function
The contribution to the likelihood function of a wage wt lying in the baseline interval
[wj 1;wj) is













is the wage survivor function, i.e. the probability of observing a wage at least as large as
the upper limit of the jth segment. If the wage is larger than the 99th percentile of the wage
distribution, it is treated as a right censored observation. The corresponding contribution to




w) = S(wJ 1=99thjxt;v): (6)
Considering the nonrandom selection process into the workforce and the discrete dis-
tribution assumption on the unobserved heterogeneity distribution, the contribution to the

















The log-likelihood function sums the logarithm of this expression over all the individuals
(employed and nonemployed) and is estimated by maximum likelihood. The estimations
are separately run for men and women and for the periods 1994–1996 and 2004–2006.
3.3 Estimation Results of the Wage Structures
This subsection reports and comments on the impact of the regressors on the male and
female wage hazard functions and, thereby, on the wage distribution functions. The estima-
tion results of the employment selection equation are in line with the expectations. They
are reported in Table 8 and commented in Appendix A. As mentioned in Subsection 3.1,
the impact of covariates on the shape of the wage density functions is ﬂexibly modelled,
so that it can be different over the wage support. In other words, analogously to quantile
regression, the covariates can have different effects at different percentiles of the wage dis-
tribution. Hence, in Tables 4 and 5 we document the effects of the covariates at selected
percentiles for men and women, respectively, both in the 1990s and in the 2000s.
11Two points are worthy of mention. First, Tables 4 and 5 display selection-corrected
estimation results.15 The Log-likelihood Ratio (LR) tests reported at the end of these tables
indicate that the null hypothesis of no sample selection can be rejected quite conﬁdently
for women, both in the 1990s and in the 2000s. For men, the null hypothesis of no sample
selection is rejected in the 1990s, but not rejected in the 2000s. Second, the estimated
coefﬁcients inform us about the covariate impact on the wage hazard function: individual
characteristics that have a negative effect on the wage hazard rate reduce the probability of
getting a low wage. Individuals holding these characteristics are therefore more likely to get
a higher wage with respect to the reference group.
Getting older increases the probability of getting high wages in both periods. Education
and occupation play signiﬁcant roles in explaining the male and female wage distributions.
Higher educational attainments (such as post secondary or tertiary) and high-skilled and
white-collar occupations are associated with higher wages. This is true across the overall
wage distribution for both genders and time periods, with the exception of women at the top
of the distribution (since the 75th percentile) in the mid-2000s.
We ﬁnd geographical differentials in the distribution of wages, characterized by relevant
pay disadvantages in the Centre and especially in the South of Italy in the mid-1990s. The
geographical pay gaps maintain their relevance at the bottom of the wage distribution (up to
the 25th percentile) for both genders in the mid-2000s and seem to disappear at the top of
the wage distributions of both men and women.
Having a temporary job is associated with high wages especially for men in the middle
and at the top of the wage distribution in the mid-1990s. Ten years later this evidence has
changed. Male temporary workers are indeed paid lower wages than male permanent work-
ers across all the wage distribution. Only at the top of the distribution, the negative effect
of temporary contracts becomes smaller and not signiﬁcantly different from zero. This in
line with Barbieri and Cutuli (2009), who, using similar data and quantile regression, ﬁnd
that temporary workers earn less than permanent workers with a gap tending to zero at the
top of the wage distribution. The change over time of the association between the type of
contract and wages might be due to the labour market reforms. Before the reforms, tem-
porary contracts could be used in very limited circumstances (e.g. to replace a worker in
sick leave) and workers willing to take a job for a limited period of time were maybe com-
pensated for the instability and idiosyncrasy of the close-ended contract. The labour market
reforms have made temporary contracts the norm and have created a dual system in which
permanent workers have kept the usual level of employment protection. The presence of a
dual labour market might therefore explain the increased gap in wages between temporary
and permanent workers before and after the labour market reforms.
With regard to the remaining covariates, subjective (or perceived) health status does not
affect earnings so much. Marital status affects male wage distribution in both periods and
married men are better paid, especially in the mid-2000s. Part-time jobs are found to be



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14better paid on hourly basis, for both genders and time periods. Finally, the time indicators
have always a small and not signiﬁcant impact on the wage hazard rate, both for men and
women. It suggests that the shape of the wage distributions did not change signiﬁcantly
within each time window.
4 Counterfactual Wage Distributions and Decompositions
of Gender Wage Gaps
4.1 The Components of the Gender Wage Gap in the Mid-1990s and
in the Mid-2000s
In the previous section we estimated the male and female wage structures, i.e. the set of
parameters determining the male and female hazard functions that fully characterize the
conditional wage distributions. We can exploit these estimated wage structures to simulate
wage distributions by way of the following algorithm, which is run once for men and once
for women:
1. Draw a vector of parameter estimates assuming normality around the point estimates
b  with a variance-covariance matrix equal to the estimated one.
2. Generate N individualsby drawing N times: i) avector x of covariatesfrom theempir-
ical distribution of covariates among all women (men);16 ii) unobserved characteristics
from the estimated distribution of unobserved heterogeneity b G.
3. For each baseline wage interval [wj 1;wj) with j = 1;:::;71, we compute the pre-
dicted (wage histogram) cumulative distribution function from the following theoreti-








Fori = 1;:::;N, wedrawi fromastandarduniformdistribution. If b F(wj 1jxit;b vi) 
i < b F(wjjxit;b vi), individual i is assigned a random wage in [wj 1;wj).17
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 R = 999 times to get R independent realizations and build Monte
Carlo conﬁdence intervals.
We exploit this simulation algorithm and a slightly modiﬁed version to decompose the
gender wage gap into the component due to gender differences in the distribution of individ-
16Work speciﬁc covariates are drawn from the empirical distribution conditional on work participation.
17Wecanindeedonlysimulateanintervalinwhichthewageislocated. Apointvalueisassignedbydrawing
from a uniform distribution between the lower and upper bound of the interval, without losing much in terms
of precision given the small size of the intervals.
15ual characteristics and the component due to gender differences in the remunerations of the
same characteristics. The idea of the decomposition of the gender pay gap is based on re-
covering the counterfactual distribution that would prevail if men had the same distribution






where the subscripts F and M stand for female and male, respectively. The counterfactual
marginal density in (7) is obtained by repeating the simulation algorithm for men with step
2 revised so that the covariate vectors are drawn from the empirical covariate distribution of
women.
At this point, by denoting by Q() the log-quantile function, we can decompose the
gender wage gap at each quantile q 2 [0;100] as follows
Q(qjb M;xM) Q(qjb F;xF) =





Q(qjb M;xF)   Q(qjb F;xF)

; (8)
where, for G 2 fF;Mg, b G is the set of estimated coefﬁcients of the wage structure and xG
is the set of individual characteristics. On the right-hand side of (8), the ﬁrst term in brackets
is the gender wage gap (difference in log points) at quantile q if men and women were
equally paid for their own characteristics. In other words, it is the component of the gender
wage gap explained by gender differences in the distribution of individual characteristics.
The second term in brackets is the gender wage gap at quantile q if men had the same
characteristics as women, i.e. the part explained by different coefﬁcients.
Figure 2 reports the gender wage gaps and their decompositions in the mid-1990s (top
panel) and in the mid-2000s (bottom panel). The central curves plot the total wage gaps,
which are computed by taking the difference between the log male wages and the log female
wages at each quantile of the corresponding wage distribution, i.e. the left-hand side of
equation (8). The curves at the bottom are instead the wage gaps once gender differences
in the remuneration are netted out, i.e. the ﬁrst term in brackets on the right-hand side
of equation (8). Finally, the curves at the top plot the wage gap once gender differences
in observed characteristics are taken into account, i.e. the second term in brackets on the
right-hand side of equation (8). The corresponding point estimates for selected quantiles are
reported in Table 6.
We saw in Section 2 that the raw median wage penalty for women was about 6% in the
mid-1990s and 5% in the mid-2000s. When we net out the component due to gender dif-
ferences in the distribution of individual characteristics and we control for sample selection,
16the median pay gap increases to 17.4%18 in the mid-1990s and to 24.6%19 in the mid-2000s.
The importance of controlling for gender differences in the distribution of individual charac-
teristics is even more striking at the top of the distribution. While the raw gender wage gap
at the 90th percentile was nil both in the mid-1990s and in the mid-2000s, it rises up to 30%
in the mid-1990s and 31.5% in the mid-2000s when gender differences in the distribution
of individual characteristics are controlled for. This suggests that in Italy men and women
had different levels of labour market qualiﬁcations both in the mid-1990s and in the mid-
2000s, with women relatively more endowned of qualiﬁcations that ensure large rewards,
especially at the top of the wage distribution.
Figure 2: Sample Selection Corrected Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gaps (gap in log
points)
Notes: The grey areas are Monte Carlo 95% conﬁdence intervals, computed by 999 replications.
1817:4% = [exp(0:160)   1]  100.
1924:6% = [exp(0:220)   1]  100.
17Table 6: Sample Selection Corrected Decomposition of the Gen-
der Wage Gaps (gap in log points) at Selected Quantiles
ECHP, 1994–1996 SILC, 2004–2006
Quantiles q Wage gap 95% conﬁdence interval§ Wage gap 95% conﬁdence interval§
Total wage gap: Q(qjb M;xM)   Q(qjb F;xF)
5 0.298* 0.220 0.366 0.172* 0.127 0.224
10 0.220* 0.142 0.279 0.143* 0.109 0.176
25 0.128* 0.080 0.162 0.114* 0.090 0.136
50 0.109* 0.064 0.133 0.108* 0.079 0.135
75 0.112* 0.055 0.144 0.096* 0.055 0.132
90 0.140* 0.057 0.194 0.057* 0.013 0.101
95 0.164* 0.090 0.215 0.046 -0.008 0.095
Part explained by different coefﬁcients: Q(qjb M;xF)   Q(qjb F;xF)
5 0.370* 0.293 0.437 0.227* 0.183 0.274
10 0.286* 0.209 0.348 0.205* 0.168 0.240
25 0.184* 0.141 0.219 0.197* 0.170 0.222
50 0.160* 0.121 0.186 0.220* 0.189 0.249
75 0.196* 0.143 0.232 0.273* 0.228 0.317
90 0.263* 0.179 0.320 0.274* 0.216 0.333
95 0.269* 0.188 0.330 0.280* 0.210 0.346
Part explained by different characteristics: Q(qjb M;xM)   Q(qjb M;xF)
5 -0.073* -0.113 -0.033 -0.055* -0.092 -0.019
10 -0.066* -0.094 -0.036 -0.061* -0.088 -0.035
25 -0.056* -0.074 -0.039 -0.083* -0.104 -0.064
50 -0.051* -0.070 -0.032 -0.112* -0.137 -0.087
75 -0.084* -0.114 -0.054 -0.177* -0.213 -0.143
90 -0.123* -0.165 -0.075 -0.217* -0.266 -0.171
95 -0.105* -0.150 -0.059 -0.235* -0.294 -0.173
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
§ Monte Carlo conﬁdence intervals computed by 999 replications.
18Estimations of wage distributions and gender wage gap decomposition are corrected for
sample selection, so that we take into account that, due to nonrandom selection into employ-
ment, non-working men and women have different earnings potential or give different value
to earning money.20 As a matter of fact, social norms according to which men have to be the
sole breadwinner might repress female participation in the workforce. As a consequence,
only women with very high earnings potential are able to compensate the cost of deviating
from the social norms and enter the workforce. If it is so and nonrandom selection into em-
ployment is not controlled for, the gender wage gap would be underestimated. As a matter
of fact, like in Picchio and Mussida (2011), if we do not correct for sample selection we ﬁnd
lower pay penalties for women.21 In Italy there is therefore evidence of positive selection of
women into the workforce, i.e. women with low earnings potential are less likely to feature
in the observed wage distribution than comparable men.
Although we net out the effect of gender differences in the selection into employment,
we cannot conclude that the sizeable gender wage gap, persistent over time and even larger
after controlling for gender differences in the distribution of individual characteristics, is ev-
idence of discrimination.22 There might be a discriminatory component, like disparity in the
remuneration of similar characteristics or sectoral segregation such that women are excluded
from “male” and better rewarded jobs. Nevertheless, there might be non-discriminatory
forces at work. For instance, the gap might be due to female deﬁcits in unmeasured skills
with high rewards. Alternatively, women might follow social expectations and choose ca-
reers which allow them to fulﬁl family commitments. Lastly, experimental studies suggest
that women are more altruistic and less career-oriented than men. For example, Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007) ﬁnd that, given the same level of ability and skills, women are more
likely than men to choose pay schemes which are less rewarding and less competitive. This
might reﬂect greater risk aversion or also that women dislike negotiation.
4.2 The Trend over Time of the Components of the Gender Wage Gap
If one looks at the raw descriptive statistics in Table 2, it seems that wages of women have
caught up, although not fully, with the wages of men in the period that goes from the mid-
1990s to the mid-2000s. Although the median and the mean gender wage gap decreased just
from 6% to 5%, sizeable changes are instead displayed at the bottom of the wage distribu-
tion: the gender pay gap at the 5th percentile went from almost 20% in the mid-1990s to
20As stressed by the job satisfaction literature (see e.g. Chevalier, 2007), men and women might have dif-
ferent tastes and preferences, leading to different choices in the labour market.
21The estimation results and the gender wage gap decompositions without sample selection are available
upon request from the authors.
22The unexplained component of the gender pay gap is often viewed as discrimination by the literature
(Chevalier, 2007). Discriminatory behaviours are nonetheless difﬁcult to observe. Only very detailed infor-
mation might help ﬁnding evidence of discrimination for the process under investigation, e.g. employment
discrimination in hiring (Goldin and Rouse, 2000).
1912% in the mid-2000s. The sample selection corrected ﬁgures reported in the top panel of
Table 6 seem to conﬁrm such a time evolution. Once we control for gender differences in
the nonrandom selection into employment, the gender wage gap decreases from almost 35%
in the mid-1990s to 18.8% in the mid-2000s at the 5th percentile of the wage distribution, it
is rather stable in the centre of the wage distribution, and it goes from about 15% to about
6% at the top of the distribution.
However, once we net out the component due to gender differences in individual charac-
teristics, a different picture pops up. The top graph of Figure 3 and the top panel of Table 7
display the change over time of the gender wage gap if men and women had the same char-
acteristics. They tell us that, from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the gender wage gap
if men and women had the same characteristics signiﬁcantly decreased by 10.6 (6.2) per-
centage points at the 5th (10th) percentile, but it signiﬁcantly increased in the centre of the
distribution, especially between the median and the 75th percentile (4.9 and 6.1 percentage
points respectively).
How can we explain rising gender wage gaps in the middle of the distribution and de-
creasing gender wage gaps at the bottom? Is it that a change in skill prices beneﬁted women
relative to men at bottom jobs and men relative to women at better jobs? Or is it that women
at better jobs became relatively richer in skills that are paid more and more differently be-
tween genders, with time increasing penalties for women?
In order to answer these questions, we parcel out the sources of the time variation of the
gender wage gap into a component due to the gender relative changing prices in the labour
market and a component due to the time change in female-speciﬁc characteristics. Formally,
the change over time of the gender wage gap if men and women had the same characteristics,









































































This decomposition illustrates that the change over time of the gender wage gap if men
and women had the same characteristics can be explained by the the trend in the wage
structure, equation (10), and by the trend in female characteristics, equation (11). The coun-
terfactual quantile functions which appear in equations (9)-(11) are predicted by running
simulation algorithms similar to the one described in the previous subsection, but modi-
ﬁed so as to draw estimated parameters and individual characteristics by the corresponding
time period/gender combination.23 For example, the values taken by the quantile function
Q(qjb 90s
M ;x00s
F ), which appears in equations (10) and (11) are simulated by running the fol-
23As the reliability of these simulations depends on the capacity of our model to predict the realized wage
distributions, we compute goodness-of-ﬁt checks of the estimated model and report them in Appendix B.
20lowing algorithm:
1. Draw a vector of parameter estimates assuming normality around the point estimates
b 90s
M with a variance-covariance matrix equal to the estimated one.
2. Generate N women by drawing N times: i) a vector x of covariates from the em-
pirical distribution of covariates among all women in 2004–2006; ii) the unobserved
component from the estimated distribution of unobserved heterogeneity b G90s
M .
3. For each baseline wage interval [wj 1;wj) with j = 1;:::;71, we compute the pre-
dicted (wage histogram) cumulative distribution function from the following theoreti-








Fori = 1;:::;N, wedrawi fromastandarduniformdistribution. If b F(wj 1jxit;b vi) 
i < b F(wjjxit;b vi), individual i is assigned a random wage in [wj 1;wj).
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 R = 999 times to get R independent realizations.
The central parts of Figure 3 and Table 7 display the component of the time variation of
thegenderwagegapduetothegenderrelativepricechangeinthelabourmarket. Thegender
relative changes in prices of observed and unobserved characteristics signiﬁcantly increased
thegenderwagegapby7.9and8.9percentagepointsatthemedianandatthe75th percentile
of the wage distribution, respectively. Women at the bottom were instead favoured, with a
6.1 percentage points decrease in the gender wage gap, however not signiﬁcant at 5%. The
bottom panels of Figure 3 and Table 7 report the component due to the time change in
female-speciﬁc characteristics. The impact, if any, was negative: women became richer
(poorer) in skills which are characterized less (more) by female penalties in rewards. The
trend in the female distribution of individual characteristics gave however a small and not
signiﬁcant contribution to the reduction of the gender wage gap over time.
4.3 Discussion
Hence, asfoundbyBlauandKhan(1997)intheUS,inrecentyearsItalianwomenhavebeen
mostly swimming upstream, i.e. the wage structure has been increasingly unfavourable, es-
pecially for women at centre-top jobs. What are the possible reasons for which women at the
centre-top of the wage distribution swam against the tide in the decade under analysis? Why
did women at the bottom of the wage distribution experience instead a slightly favourable
trend in the gender relative wage structure? We claim that the institutional change deter-
mined by the labour market reforms might have generated both favourable and unfavourable
trends in the female wage structure, with different relative sizes across the wage distribution.
21Figure 3: Decomposition of the Change over Time of the Gender Wage Gap
Notes: The grey areas are Monte Carlo 95% conﬁdence intervals, computed by 999 replications.
22Table 7: Decomposition of the Change over Time of
the Gender Wage Gap at Selected Quantiles
Gender wage gap variation
Quantiles q in percentage points 95% conﬁdence interval§
Change over time of the gender wage gap if men and
women had the same characteristics: equation (9)
5 -10.6* -16.4 -4.4
10 -6.2* -11.8 -0.2
25 1.1 -2.6 5.4
50 4.9* 1.6 9.2
75 6.1* 1.3 11.7
90 0.9 -5.9 9.2
95 1.0 -6.2 9.3
Change over time due to changes in the wage structure: equation (10)
5 -6.1 -12.6 1.2
10 0.3 -5.2 7.0
25 3.4 -0.3 7.5
50 7.9* 3.9 12.2
75 8.9* 3.2 16.0
90 1.9 -5.3 10.1
95 2.3 -6.1 12.2
Change over time due to changes in individual characteristics: equation (11)
5 -4.4 -11.8 3.7
10 -6.6 -13.9 1.4
25 -2.3 -6.8 2.3
50 -2.9 -7.1 1.4
75 -2.8 -9.1 3.4
90 -1.0 -9.3 8.1
95 -1.3 -10.5 7.7
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
§ Monte Carlo conﬁdence intervals computed by 999 replications.
23As mentioned in the Introduction, from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s, the Italian
labour market went through important reforms, which essentially made it easier to create
ﬂexible and atypical job contracts, while leaving unchanged the legislation and the pro-
tection of employees with open-ended contracts. This shaped a two tier regime (Boeri
and Garibaldi, 2007; OECD, 2004, chapter 2) with, on one side, highly protected work-
ers (mostly male unionized workers) and, on the other side, highly ﬂexible jobs (part-time
jobs, seasonal jobs, youth work-training, on call jobs, and work on project) especially for
the marginal and weakest labour market segments.24 Therefore, after the labour market re-
forms women have been more likely to be at work in more ﬂexible, less unionized,25 and
less protected segments of the labour market, where special treatments or discriminatory
practices on gender ground might arise or become more marked.
Nevertheless, the introduction of ﬂexible work arrangements might have generated a
favourable trend in the female wage structure by increasing the likelihood that women have
better opportunities to combine work and family life: ﬂexible work arrangements provide
women not only with ports of entry into employment in the form of ﬂexible contracts, but
also with springboards towards jobs with better employment conditions. As a matter of fact,
Barbieri and Sestito (2008) ﬁnd that in Italy temporary work increases future chances of
having a “satisfactory employment” especially for women.
However, the stepping stone effect of atypical contracts might have been heterogeneous
across the sample. The introduction of ﬂexible and atypical contracts can especially increase
the chances of the most disadvantaged groups of being at work with better employment
conditions.26 This might explain why we observe a slight improvement in the wage structure
only for women at the bottom jobs.
Finally, these explanations need to be qualiﬁed as there might be other forces at work.
For example, as pointed out by Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), if men and women are
not perfect substitutes in production and the female workforce grows (as it did in the time
window under analysis in Italy), women’s relative wages are reduced, other things constant.
Hence, even if our ﬁndings about the wage structure becoming increasingly unfavourable
for women are correct, we cannot exclude that there might be other factors explaining this
trend.
24Empirical studies have shown that the introduction of new atypical work arrangements segmented the
Italian labour market between the insider core labour force and a secondary segment of unstable and ﬂexible
jobs (Barbieri and Scherer, 2008).
25Union density rates among atypical workers can be lower for different reasons (Goslinga and Sverke,
2003). For instance, employees with atypical contracts are more difﬁcult to organize for unions (Gallagher
and Sverke, 2005). Moreover, unions are reluctant to accept temporary contracts or part-time contracts as
unions often oppose the growth of forms of employment which can be exploited by employers as a mere
buffer against the business cycle, or which go towards an overall reduction of working time (Delsen, 1995;
Barling and Gallagher, 1996).
26For example, Cockx and Picchio (2011) ﬁnd that for Belgian youth short-lived jobs are stepping stones
to long-lasting jobs especially for more disadvantaged individuals, e.g. the lower educated and those living in
areas where the unemployment rate is higher.
245 Conclusions
The Italian gender wage gap from raw data, either in mean or at several quantiles of the
wage distribution, decreased in the time window that goes from the mid-1990s until the
mid-2000s. The closing raw gender wage gap might induce to think that gender inequality
in the Italian labour market diminished and that gender discriminatory practices subsided.
The decreased raw gender wage gap was however coincident with relevant developments in
the labour market, mostly in terms of legislation, but also in terms of workforce participation
and composition. Since the late 1990s Italy has undertaken steps towards “ﬂexibility” by
way of labour market reforms that have liberalized the use of ﬂexible and atypical contracts.
The female employment rates and the female educational levels have experienced a sizeable
increase, both in absolute terms and relatively to men. These labour market developments
might have partially contributed to a falling gender gap, but there are reasons to believe that
these important changes might have asymmetrically hit different components of the gender
wage gap. If it is so, the raw evidence of decreasing gender wage gaps might simply be a
statistical artefact, with the risk of generating misleading conclusions.
As a matter of fact, the gender wage gap can be decomposed into a component due to
gender differences in the distribution of individual characteristics and a component due to
gender differences in the reward of the same characteristics. These two components might
have had different time trends. Understanding the evolution over time of each component
and the contribution of each component to the evolution of the gender wage gap can be
very policy relevant to design interventions that are effective in pursuing the gender equality
target.
The empirical analysis exploited the estimator of probability distribution functions in
the presence of covariates and sample selection proposed by Picchio and Mussida (2011)
and microsimulations to decompose the gender wage gap and its variation over time. We
decomposed the gender wage gap at each quantile of the wage distribution into a part due
to different coefﬁcients determining the wage structure and a part due to different individual
characteristics. The empirical analysis was based on 1994–1996 ECHP data and on 2004–
2006 SILC data.
When we netted out the component due to gender differences in the distribution of indi-
vidual characteristics and we controlled for sample selection, the median pay gap for women
increased from 6% to 17% in the mid-1990s, and from 5% to the 25% in the mid-2000s.
Hence, if men and women had had the same distribution of individual characteristics ﬁxed
at the corresponding time period, the gender wage gap at the median of the wage distribution
would have increased over the decade under analysis from 17% to 25%.
When we parcelled out the source of the time variation, we found that women in Italy
have been mostly swimming upstream, i.e. the wage structure has been increasingly un-
favourable, especially for women at centre-top jobs. The trend in the female distribution of
individual characteristics contributed instead to the reduction of the gender wage gap over
time. However, this negative impact on the gender wage gap was not signiﬁcant and too
25small in size to compensate the positive impact of the relative change in the wage structure.
We claimed that the labour market reforms might explain why the trends in the wage
structure were unfavourable to women, especially at the centre-top of the wage distribution.
The institutional change shaped a two tier regime: on one side, highly protected workers
(mostly male unionized workers) and, on the other side, highly ﬂexible jobs especially for
the marginal and weakest labour market segments. Therefore, after the labour market re-
forms women have been more likely to be at work in more ﬂexible, less unionized, and less
protected segments of the labour market, where special treatments, prejudices, or discrim-
inatory practices on gender ground might arise or become more marked. Nevertheless, the
labour market reforms might have provided women, especially at the bottom jobs, not only
with ports of entry into employment in the form of ﬂexible contracts, but also with spring-
boards towards jobs with better employment conditions, explaining why we found a slight
improvement in the wage structure for women at the bottom of the wage distribution.
The conclusion to be drawn from this research is that more effective policies in pursuing
the gender equality target are needed in Italy. Policy interventions should aim at bringing
about a less segregated labour market, as in less protected segments discriminatory practices
are more likely to arise. Furthermore, ﬂexible contracts, which can enhance gender equality
by ensuring that women have a better access to good quality jobs and better opportunities
to reconcile family and work, might not be enough as long as women are trapped into tradi-
tional roles by social norms. As a matter of fact, ﬂexible jobs might be a barrier hindering
gender equality, if they only ensure that women continue to bear on their shoulders most
of the family responsibilities and to be conﬁned to part-time or marginal jobs. Childcare
and family policies can therefore be the leverage to make ﬂexibility the way through which
women can fully commit themselves to work.
Appendix
A Non Random Selection into Employment
Table 8 reports the estimation results of the discrete mixture logit model for the probability
of employment by gender and by time periods. The results are in line with the expectations.
The employment probability decreases with age but increases with potential experience.
Higher educated people are more likely to be at work. While in the mid-1990s the em-
ployment probability was the highest in the North-East, followed by the North-West and the
Centre, and the lowest in the South, in the mid-2000s the North and the Centre shared the
same employment probability. Family structure and married status have opposite effects on
work participation between men and women, strongly consistent with the male breadwin-
ner system: married (wo)men have a (lower) higher probability of being employed; work
participation is increasing in the number of children for men, whereas it is decreasing in the
number of children for women. Finally, the number of household members and a bad health
26condition reduce the employment probability both for men and women.
Table 8: Estimation Results of the Employment Equation by Gender and Time Period
1994–1996 2004–2006
Men Women Men Women
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Age (years) -.696 *** .106 -.926 *** .074 -1.341 *** .147 -1.767 *** .113
Potential exper. (years) 1.423 *** .095 2.720 *** .077 1.572 *** .126 2.436 *** .095
Education – Reference: None, elementary, or lower secondary
Upper secondary 1.173 *** .138 2.250 *** .122 1.799 *** .167 2.508 *** .161
Post secon. or tertiary 1.142 *** .203 2.479 *** .190 1.881 *** .219 4.274 *** .200
Area of residence – Reference: North-West
North-East 1.489 *** .292 -.370 * .208 .118 .249 .454 ** .209
Centre -1.118 *** .206 -.741 *** .176 -.330 .251 .013 .203
South -2.512 *** .208 -1.336 *** .159 -2.424 *** .261 -1.524 *** .197
Bad health -.460 *** .138 -.138 .142 -1.136 *** .170 -.367 ** .147
Married 2.466 *** .188 -.957 *** .143 2.635 *** .237 -1.594 *** .165
# household members -2.538 *** .474 -2.169 *** .462 -2.316 *** .596 -2.674 *** .615
Presence kids<12 years -.113 .201 -.121 .178 1.075 *** .189 -.629 *** .153
Time dummies – Reference: 1996 or 2006
1994 or 2004 .747 *** .174 .440 ** .195 .005 .179 .624 *** .170
1995 or 2005 .267 .185 .202 .203 .288 .177 .158 .172
Unobserved heterogeneity support points and probability masses
"1 2.285 *** .280 .994 *** .247 2.552 *** .330 2.307 *** .285
"2 -4.464 *** .349 -9.632 *** .353 -4.217 *** .371 -5.985 *** .333
1 -.066 .054 -.100 .067 -.052 .045 .244 *** .053
2 -1.115 *** .109 .427 *** .097 -1.811 *** .184 .070 .099
3 -2.267 *** .275 -2.146 * 1.104 -1.715 *** .165 -1.003 *** .260
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
B Goodness-of-Fit
In this appendix we check the goodness-of-ﬁt of the model by contrasting empirical aspects
of the data with those predicted by model simulations. Given the mixture of parametric and
non-parametric assumptions on our econometric model and that the counterfactual exercises
in Section 4 are based on simulations, it is indeed important to assess the ability of the
model to provide quantitative predictions of the statistics of primary interest. Predictions
are computed by implementing the following simulation algorithm for men and women,
using ECHP data for the mid-1990s and SILC data for the mid-2000s:
1. Draw a vector of parameter estimates assuming normality around the point estimates
b  with a variance-covariance matrix equal to the estimated one.
2. Generate N individuals by drawing N times: i) z and x from the empirical distri-
bution of covariates; ii) unobserved characteristics from the estimated distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity b G.
3. Simulate work participation by a lottery based on the predicted probability of work
participation. More in detail, for i = 1;:::;N we draw i from a standard uniform
27distribution. If (z0
itb F + b "i) > i, individual i participates. Otherwise, she does not
participate and her simulation is halted.
4. Simulate the wage distribution over the subsample of participating individuals. For
each baseline wage interval [wj 1;wj) with j = 1;:::;71, we compute the predicted









For i = 1;:::;N, we draw i from a standard uniform distribution. Individual i is as-
signedawagerandomlydrawnfromauniformdistributionin [wj 1;wj) if b F(wj 1jxit;
b vi)  i < b F(wjjxit;b vi).
5. Repeat steps 1 to 4 R = 999 times to get R independent realizations and build Monte
Carlo conﬁdence intervals.
Once we run this simulation algorithm for men and women in both time periods, we derive,
per each time period, the predicted gender wage gap by contrasting the male simulated wage
distribution with the female one. The goodness-of-ﬁt can be veriﬁed by checking whether
the actual gender pay gap lies within the conﬁdence intervals of the simulated one.
The top panel of Table 9 and the top graph of Figure 4 report the goodness-of-ﬁt of the
model in predicting the gender wage gap in the mid-1990s using ECHP data. The panel in
the middle of Table 9 and the graph in the middle of Figure 4 focus on the goodness-of-ﬁt
of the model in predicting the gender wage gap in the mid-2000s using SILC data. Finally,
at the bottom of Table 9 and Figure 4, we contrast the actual variation and the predicted
variation over time of the gender wage gap. We check thereby the goodness of the model in
ﬁtting the change over time in the gender wage gap, i.e. the statistic of primary interest in
this study.
The model perfectly ﬁts the gender wage gaps observed in the mid-2000. Nevertheless,
it shows some problems in ﬁtting the gender wage gaps in the mid-1990s: the ﬁt is ﬁne until
the 80th percentile of the wage distribution; thereafter the model somewhat systematically
overpredictsthegenderwagegap, especiallyatthe95th percentile. However, thepoorability
ofthemodelinﬁttinggenderwage gapsinthemid-1990sislimitedtoasmallsegmentofthe
wage support. Finally, the bottom panel of Table 9 and the bottom graph of Figure 4 show
that the model predicts very well the change over time in the gender wage gap. Only at the
very top of the wage distribution the actual change lies outside the conﬁdence interval of the
simulated one: as a consequence of the overprediction of the gender wage gap at the top of
the distribution in the mid-1990s, the variation in the gender wage gap is underpredicted in
that region.
28Table 9: Goodness-of-Fit: The Gender Wage Gap and
Its Variation over Time at Selected Quantiles
Quantile Actual† Simulated 95% conﬁdence interval§
Gender wage gap in 1994–1996 (log points)
5 0.182 0.204 0.147 0.267
10 0.107 0.124 0.090 0.162
25 0.081 0.085 0.064 0.105
50 0.059 0.064 0.045 0.080
75 0.036 0.058 0.031 0.082
90 -0.008 0.049 0.008 0.089
95 -0.011 0.084 0.049 0.117
Gender wage gap in 2004–2006 (log points)
5 0.113 0.119 0.078 0.157
10 0.086 0.092 0.069 0.117
25 0.070 0.075 0.057 0.092
50 0.048 0.060 0.039 0.081
75 0.031 0.042 0.015 0.068
90 0.000 0.020 -0.015 0.057
95 -0.002 0.015 -0.032 0.063
Change over time in the gender wage gap
(in percentage points)
5 -6.91 -7.25 -13.39 -1.40
10 -2.06 -2.88 -6.88 0.95
25 -1.16 -0.90 -3.43 1.65
50 -1.16 -0.38 -2.99 2.33
75 -0.51 -1.50 -5.00 2.03
90 0.80 -2.76 -7.96 2.43
95 0.87 -6.59 -12.26 -0.60
† Actual gender wage gaps lying in the 95% conﬁdence interval of the simulated
ones are in bold.
§ Monte Carlo conﬁdence intervals computed by 999 replications.
29Figure 4: Goodness-of-Fit: The Gender Wage Gap and Its Variation over Time
Notes: The grey areas are Monte Carlo 95% conﬁdence intervals, computed by 999 replications.
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